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less concerned with knowledge for its
own sake—and at times more roughhewn than their academic counterparts—were not always welcomed
by pure academics, and vice versa.

of U.S. hydrographers in accurately
charting these waters is nowhere more
apparent than in a comparison of prewar
charts of Guantánamo Bay with those
created after the American victory.

Smith details how a powerful connection between the Navy’s ever-increasing
knowledge of the maritime environment
and seagoing commerce was forged
and strengthened from the beginning.
Time (and safety) was money to
merchant captains and the owners for
whom they worked. Matthew Fontaine
Maury’s wind and current charts cut
days or weeks from sailing times, and
time saved was money earned. One
of the book’s illustrations—a whaling
chart produced by the Navy and used
extensively by the captains of Herman
Melville’s era—speaks to the cooperation
between the commercial and military
spheres. And whaling was not the only
industry to have such close ties to the
Navy; as underwater cables began to
knit together continents and colonies,
the requirement to map the topography
of the deep ocean floor became
more significant as the mechanisms
to achieve this goal advanced.

To Master the Boundless Sea also
acknowledges the Naval War College’s
role in the development of naval
hydrography and the evolution of the
nautical chart into not only an aid
to war but also a critical component
of campaign and battle planning. Of
particular note was the work of Captain
William McCarty Little in bringing war
gaming to Newport. Whereas Mahan
articulated a strategic vision, McCarty
Little’s wargaming charts mapped ways
of making that vision a strategic reality.

As steam supplanted sail and Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s strategic insights grew
to dominate naval thinking, charts became essential enablers of U.S. imperial
ambitions. Using the Spanish-American
War as a backdrop, Smith demonstrates
how charts became tools of conquest.
Spanish charts of Cuba, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines were incomplete,
and without accurate hydrographic
information American naval commanders’ difficulties increased. After
victory in the Spanish-American War,
accurate charts were vital in selecting
the locations of future naval installations
and coaling stations. The diligence
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Smith fills a major niche in understanding the role of nautical charts, the people
and organizations that created them,
and how they all advanced scientific
understanding and a larger American
identity. To Master the Boundless Sea
is a superb work that will reward the
interested and discerning reader.
RICHARD J. NORTON

The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the
Transformation of the Cold War, by Michael
Cotey Morgan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ.
Press, 2018. 424 pages. $35.

One of the bigger questions in history—
right up there with why did the Roman
Empire fall—is why did the Cold War
end. This question becomes even more
significant when one remembers that
the United States and its allies defeated
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
without a direct, military confrontation.
Other long-term strategic confrontations
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did not end so well. There are many examples, but three will suffice: Athens versus Sparta generated the Peloponnesian
War, Rome versus Carthage produced the
Punic Wars, and Britain versus Germany
resulted in World Wars I and II. As a
result, the issues that Michael Morgan
explores in The Final Act are rather large.
While historians will continue wrestling
with the issue of why the Cold War
ended, it is a testimony to the intellectual
power that Morgan brings to bear that
this book, in all likelihood, will remain
the book on the final act of the Helsinki
Accords for decades to come. Why? Both
the depth and breadth of the research
are nothing less than astonishing.
Morgan draws on material from fourteen
archives in eight nations; this material,
combined with published sources, is
in nine different languages. There are
103 pages of notes for 258 pages of text.
The writing also is quite impressive,
with sections reminiscent of Barbara W.
Tuchman’s work; Morgan even invokes
her book The Guns of August with a
chapter entitled “The Pens of August.”
With that point made, some sections read
as if a PhD dissertation committee wrote
and rewrote some paragraphs until all
the flavor was removed—which actually
might have been the case. Fortunately,
these passages are not frequent.
What does Morgan do with these
strengths? The short answer: he looks at
the accords of the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe “in the
round,” examining the perspectives of
powers large and small. After a series of
crises in the 1960s that raised questions
about the legitimacy of the Soviet Union,
Leonid I. Brezhnev pushed for the
conference, desiring Western European
recognition of the post-1945 borders
in Eastern Europe—which also would
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constitute an acknowledgment of the
validity of the Soviet system. The United
States agreed to this gathering because
it had suffered significantly in the 1960s
from the trauma of Vietnam, which
raised questions at home and abroad
about the United States and its leadership in world affairs. While the Soviets
pushed for the conference, the smaller
states of Europe were the ones most
eager to take part. The gathering granted
them a voice, and in Morgan’s narrative
they often play key roles—for instance,
in resolving diplomatic deadlocks.
Americans also were important, but
more in support than in the lead.
Presidents Richard M. Nixon and
Gerald R. Ford both saw the gathering’s
potential. Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger, on the other hand, did not
believe in this diplomatic effort, and
the best thing that can be said about
his role is that he did not get in the way
of its progress. American diplomats
were good, and often bested their
Soviet counterparts, but mainly because
Brezhnev wanted to reach an agreement
quickly, so he often compromised on
issues involving personal freedoms,
conflict resolution, and sovereignty, in
ways that ended up working against the
long-term interests of the Communist
system. As Morgan notes (turning some
issues upside down), “Human rights
provided a weapon for fighting the Cold
War, not an escape from it” (p. 6).
The most intellectually impressive part of
the book is the epilogue. Morgan looks at
the legacy of Helsinki on bringing about
the end of the Cold War. What gives this
chapter power is that he uses the words
of the defeated. Using source after source
from the other side of the Iron Curtain,
he shows how the final act changed
Communist policies and behavior.
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Wars and conflicts end only when the
defeated accept their loss, and this section
shows how new thinking developed
in the capitals of the Warsaw Pact.
Even with all these points made, not
everyone will accept Morgan’s arguments.
The crisis of legitimacy in the 1960s
certainly explains Soviet actions, but the
decade was not identical for the United
States. The constitutional legitimacy
of the U.S. government and American
leadership of its alliance were different
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and much, much, much stronger than
those of the Soviets. Despite all the persuasive power of the epilogue, it comes
up a bit short of convincing its readers,
even if Morgan is right . . . probably.
In the end, though, most historians are
lucky if they produce one book that
endures; odds are that Morgan has done
that. Expect to see this book in print
for five or six decades—it is that good.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
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